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Joseph W. Cooch*

In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative
Litigation: In the Heat of Crisis, Chancery Court
Scrutinizes Executive Compensation
I. INTRODUCTION

In In re Citigroup, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation,1 the Delaware

Court of Chancery considered whether Citigroup directors (“the
Defendants”) were liable under a Caremark2 claim for failing to monitor
business risk and a waste claim for approving a compensation package for
its outgoing CEO Charles Prince.3 The court granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss on all counts except for the waste claim.4 While refusing
to dismiss the waste claim, the court enunciated a more lenient waste
standard than the rule it typically followed, signaling a willingness to
scrutinize excessive executive compensation packages.5 Such scrutiny will
raise the possibility of strike suits and impact executive compensation
decisions by instilling a level of concern over litigation that is currently not
present in other business judgments.6

© 2011 Joseph W. Cooch
*
J.D. candidate 2011, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
2. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). A Caremark
claim is a shareholder derivative action in which directors can be held liable for loss based on a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight, such as an utter failure to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists. See id.
3. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124, 135.
4. Id. at 112.
5. See infra Part V.A (arguing that the court failed to afford the Citigroup board business
judgment deference typically associated with compensation decisions by failing to place the
burden of establishing a complete failure of consideration on the Plaintiff and by ignoring
precedent that even consideration that is difficult to value is sufficient to avoid a claim of waste).
6. See infra Parts V.B.–C. (arguing that the decision will negatively impact board decisionmaking by raising the threat of strike suits and unnecessarily influencing compensation decisions).
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II. THE CASE

A. Factual Background
Citigroup is an international financial services company that conducts a
range of business, including consumer credit and commercial securities,
banking, and transactional services.7 Citigroup’s formation was the result of
a merger between Travelers and Citicorp, in the wake of the 1999 GrammLeach-Bliley Act,8 which removed depression-era barriers between
commercial and investment banking and led to the emergence of several
financial services conglomerates.9 Among its variety of services, Citigroup
invested heavily in the real estate market.10 Like other financial services
giants, Citigroup participated in a real estate market that began to change
dramatically in the early 1980s, parting with the traditional model of
lending in which there were social ties between the debtor and creditor in
favor of a securitized debt market.11 Many extremely profitable years
followed for Citigroup and its competitors in the financial services, and
executives of those firms were compensated in an unprecedented manner.
In 2007, the collapse of the housing market caused a financial crisis, which
led to major losses for financial institutions such as Citigroup and an

7. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 112. See also Citigroup 2007 annual report, available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar07c_en.pdf.
8. The 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is also known as the Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999. Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999). Some
commentators name this legislative act as a major contributor to the financial crisis because it
allowed the biggest banks to speculate heavily in the stock markets. See LAWRENCE G.
MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 6 (Crown Business 1st ed. 2009); see also
Michael Siconolfi, Big Umbrella: Travelers and Citicorp Agree to Join Forces in $83 Billion
Merger, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1998, at A1.
9. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 74–75 (Viking Penguin 2009).
10. See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 4, In re Citigroup,
964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC) (“[A] staggering 43% of Citigroup’s equity was tied
up in subprime related assets, including $43 billion in credit derivative products.”). Those
products included collateralized debt obligations collateralized by asset–backed securities. Id. at 5.
11. See generally NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 246–61 (Penguin Press 1st ed.
2008). Real estate purchases, both commercial and residential, had historically been financed by
banks who lent to borrowers that met certain underwriting standards. Standards typically included
credit approval, down-payment of a significant percentage of the purchase price, and other
techniques meant to manage risk. Securitization of mortgages was also much less common. See
id. See also Christine Richard & David Feldheim, Mortgage-Backed Deals are Taking a Novel
Turn: Bond Issuance Supported by Unconventional Loans is Rising on Wall Street, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 17, 2004, at C2.
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ensuing recession that has been described as the worst since the Great
Depression.12
B. Procedural History
In November 2007, Citigroup announced that declines in its $55 billion in
subprime related exposure amounted to losses between $8 billion and $11
billion.13 Shareholders responded by filing a derivative action in the
Delaware Court of Chancery on November 9, 2007.14 The shareholderplaintiffs alleged that Citigroup’s directors and officers breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to monitor the risk in their subprime assets and
for failing to properly disclose the corporate exposure to the subprime
assets owned by Citigroup.15
The basis for the shareholders’ claims was that the Citigroup board
ignored a number of “red flags”16 that signaled likely problems in the
subprime mortgage market in pursuit of short term profits.17 By doing so,
the directors and managers risked the long term viability of the company.18

12. Barbara Crane et al., Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2009, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
2010, at R10. See Fortune 500 2006, available at
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/snapshots/309.htm (demonstrating $24.5 billion in
profits in 2006 and an annual growth rate of 17.9% from 1995–2005).
13. For a discussion of the rise of subprime real estate investment, see infra Part III.A.
14. Plaintiffs’ Derivative Complaint at 12, In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No.
3338-CC).
15. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 114 (2009). The court dedicated the bulk of its opinion to
analysis of the plaintiffs’ Caremark claims. It described the traditional Caremark claim as a
breach of the duty of loyalty based on a systemic failure to monitor liability creating activities —
typically employee misconduct or violations of law. It described the plaintiffs’ claim as a twist on
the typical Caremark claim because it sought to hold the defendants liable for failure to monitor
its business risk. The court recognized that although the plaintiffs framed the issue as a Caremark
claim, it was essentially an attempt to hold directors liable for business decisions that turned out
poorly for Citigroup. The court adhered to the business judgment rule, which presumes that in
making business decisions, directors act on an informed basis, in good faith and in an honest
belief that the action is in the best interest of the company. Because the plaintiffs did not
overcome this presumption by alleging interestedness or disloyalty, the bad investments enjoyed
the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. 121–25.
16. The “red flags” referred to by the plaintiffs were events from May 27, 2005 to October 18,
2007, including a New York Times article warning of a speculative bubble in the housing market,
the decline and failure of certain subprime lenders, Freddie Mac’s announcement that it would
refinance borrowers unable to afford their resetting adjustable-rate mortgages, credit rating agency
downgrades of subprime bonds, and warnings of spreading mortgage defaults. See id. at 115.
17. Id. at 114 –15.
18. Id.
VOL. 6 NO.1 2011
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The shareholders’ complaint took the form of a Caremark19 claim, which
creates liability for directors’ failure to monitor based on “a sustained or
systemic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure
to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system
exists.”20 A sustained failure of this kind creates the presumption of bad
faith.21
In addition to making Caremark claims, the shareholders also attacked
Citigroup’s subprime risk-taking with a waste claim.22 They alleged that
the directors committed waste by allowing Citigroup to purchase $2.7
billion in subprime loans from the failing banks Accredited Home Lenders
and Ameriquest Home Mortgage, to invest in structured investment
vehicles (“SIVs”),23 and to repurchase stock at “artificially inflated
prices.”24
The shareholders also alleged that the executive compensation package
for CEO Charles Prince constituted waste.25 A November 4, 2007 letter
agreement between Prince and Citigroup established that upon his departure
from the company, he would receive $68 million, including bonus, salary,
and accumulated stockholdings.26 In addition, Prince would receive an
office, an administrative assistant, a car, and a driver for five years until he
began full-time employment with another company.27 In exchange, Prince
would sign a non-compete agreement, a non-disparagement agreement, a
non-solicitation agreement, and a release of claims against Citigroup.28
On March 7, 2009, the Delaware Court of Chancery considered the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the Caremark and waste claims for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and a motion to dismiss for failure to
plead demand futility under Rule 23.1.29

19. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
20. Id. at 122 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996)).
21. Id.
22. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 115.
23. A structured investment vehicle is an “entit[y] set up to invest in a wide range of assets,
including subprime mortgage securities, with money they raise by selling short-term commercial
paper.” MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK, 22 (FT Press 2009).
24. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 111–12.
25. Id. at 115.
26. Id. at 138.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 112.
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III. BACKGROUND

A. Market Overview
Although the nationwide liquidity crisis has been abated through both
private and public action,30 the economy continued to struggle through
2010, and unemployment remains a major problem.31 A number of factors
contributed to the crisis and its severity, including banking deregulation,32 a
bubble in the residential real estate market, increased diffusion of risk, and a
compensation scheme on Wall Street that encouraged short-term risk
taking.33 The bursting of the global bubble34 in the residential real estate
market is one of the clearest contributions to the current financial crisis.35
Easily available credit, among other factors, inflated housing prices.36
Subprime lending37 became common, and included risky loans such as
30. The federal government employed a variety of strategies to prevent a complete collapse of
financial markets. See generally Sorkin, supra note 9 (detailing strategies taken by Federal
Agencies in to address the financial crisis of 2008). In dealing with the first major bank failure,
the Federal Reserve guaranteed JP Morgan against losses it might incur by purchasing the
collapsing investment bank Bear Stearns for $2.00 per share. Id. at 10. In September 2008, the
Department of the Treasury developed the Troubled Asset Relief Program in order to purchase
toxic assets that were wreaking havoc on the financial system. Id. at 446.
31. See Sara Murray, Orders Grow for Durables; Jobs Still Lag, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2010,
at A2 (stating that “[t]he labor market . . . has been slow to rebound from the global economic
crisis” and that “[t]he December jobs report found that unemployment remained at 10%”).
32. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
33. Sorkin, supra note 9, at 534.
34. A market “bubble” is an irrational market condition characterized by exuberance that
causes a surge in market prices. Ferguson, supra note 11, at 120–22. It typically forms after a
change in economic circumstances creates new opportunities, which is followed by euphoria and
overtrading, and then participation by inexperienced investors and those ready to take advantage
of them. Id. at 121–22. A “bubble” will burst when insiders realize that prices are inflated to the
point where profit is unlikely and begin to exit the market. Id. at 122. Outsiders then follow,
leaving the market and causing prices to fall dramatically. See id. Additional features shared by
bubbles are that there is typically an asymmetry of information, free flow of capital between
countries, and easy credit creation. Id.
35. Id. at 273 (“The subprime butterfly had flapped its wings and triggered a global
hurricane”).
36. Since the New Deal, the government has acted to expand the number of homeowners in
the United States. See generally Ferguson, supra note 11, at 248–53 (discussing the government’s
increasing assistance to homeowners since the 1930s). This political momentum was largely
fueled by the cultural importance of homeownership that has developed in the American psyche.
See ZANDI, supra note 23, at 45 (stating that “[t]he roots of the subprime financial shock begin in
the American psyche. . . no other country values hearth and home more highly”). In 2001, the
Federal Reserve lowered interest rates in order to stimulate the economy to aid recovery from the
collapse of the dot-com bubble and the impact of the terror attacks of September 11 on the
economy. See SORKIN, supra note 9, at 4. Low interest rates made borrowing cheap, which
VOL. 6 NO.1 2011
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adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”),38 negative amortization ARMs,39 and
“NINJA” (no income no job no assets) loans.40 A variety of financial
innovations allowed the diffusion of the risk associated with subprime
lending,41 and as a result many financial institutions believed that subprime
investments were essentially risk-free.42 In the years leading up to the
collapse, executives of the largest companies, and financial institutions in
The
particular, were compensated in an unprecedented manner.43

encouraged risk taking. Compare ZANDI, supra note 23, at 63 (identifying easy credit as the
biggest factor driving the home-buying binge that peaked in 2005 and stating that Fed Chairman
Alan Greenspan failed to see the risk in his interest rate-cutting approach to central banking), with
FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 266–67 (rejecting criticism of Chairman Greenspan as failing to
properly regulate mortgage lending). Many who would not typically be able to afford real estate
entered the property market. See id. at 264–65. These factors combined to increase property
ownership from 64% to 69% of all U.S. households from 1995 to 2005, while housing prices rose
180%. Id. at 266.
37. “Subprime” refers to mortgages for borrowers who do not qualify for prime interest rates
because of weak credit history, as demonstrated by delinquency, judgments, bankruptcy, low
credit score, or high loan-to-value ratios. See Plaintiffs’ Derivative Complaint at 61, In re
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC).
38. An adjustable rate mortgage is a mortgage loan in which the interest rate is variable and
changes periodically in relation to an index. THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, CONSUMER
HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES, (AUG. 6, 2009) available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms_english.htm.
39. A negative amortization ARM is an adjustable rate mortgage in which the customer
makes monthly payments at a rate below the actual interest rate for a certain period of time, during
which time the unpaid interest is added to the principal balance. Id.
40. Ramsey Su, Why Be a Nation of Mortgage Slaves?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2009, at A9.
“NINJA” is a slang term for a mortgage in which the lender ignores standard verification involved
in mortgage lending such as income, employment, and asset verification. See NINJA Loan,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/ninja-loan.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
41. Securitization allowed financial institutions to transform illiquid debt into a security, and
sell the security to Wall Street Banks who would convert the security into Residential MortgageBacked Securities (“RMBSs”), Collateralized Debt Obligations (“CDOs”), and other instruments
that were marketed and sold to other investors. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET 573 (Aspen, 3d ed. 2003). Although these instruments often contained very risky
elements, they were frequently given triple-A ratings by Moody’s and other ratings agencies. See
FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 268–69. This process diffused risk, and allowed banks, pension
funds, and even individuals to invest in the real estate debt market. Id. at 269. Credit default
swaps further diffused risk by allowing institutions holding these instruments to insure themselves
from losses. See MCDONALD & ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 168–69. Many institutions were
eager to sell such insurance because they failed to see the likelihood that the instruments would
result in loss. Id.
42. SORKIN, supra note 9, at 5.
43. Charles Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, MOTIVATING PEOPLE, Jan.
2003, available at
http://www.carlospitta.com/Courses/Gestion%20Financiera%20Internacional/Cases/Executive%2
0Compensation.pdf.
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seemingly reliable upward trajectory of property values plateaued and
began to decrease by 2007.44 The “teaser rates” that tempted borrowers
into adjustable rate mortgages began to reset at significantly higher interest
rates, and many fell behind on their payments.45 Default rates on subprime
assets proved to be higher than expected by underwriters, so the variety of
subprime investments revealed themselves to be overpriced.46 The
previously-admired47 diffusion of risk throughout the market meant that the
global financial market in its entirety was susceptible.48 In August 2007, it
became clear that the collapse of the subprime market would affect global
markets when a pair of Bear Stearns-owned hedge funds lost $1.6 billion on
subprime investments.49 The collapse of Bear Stearns itself, followed by
Lehman Brothers and many other banks unleashed the financial crisis.50
Some banks survived as a result of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(“TARP”), which sought to stabilize financial markets by injecting
hundreds of billions of dollars into the nation’s largest banks.51
Some commentators believe that executive compensation schemes that
developed during this time contributed to the financial crisis.52 In the wake
of the collapse, public outcry over executive compensation reached fever
pitch as people witnessed the same financial services executives that they

44. FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 270.
45. Id. By May 2008, approximately 11% of subprime ARMs fell into foreclosure. Id. at
271.
46. Id. at 271.
47. As described above, many thought diffusion of risk created an investment era nearly
immune from risk. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Notably, Secretary of the Treasury
Timothy Geithner, then acting as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, expressed
concern that it actually created a systemic problem. See SORKIN, supra note 9, at 65.
48. FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 271–73.
49. See SORKIN, supra note 9, at 5–6.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 524. Citigroup itself received $25 billion in initial TARP funding, but required
an additional $20 billion in November 2008. Id. at 524, 530. Furthermore, Treasury insured
hundreds of billions of Citigroup assets. Id. at 530. By February 2009, the government was a
36% stakeholder in the company. Id. Whether TARP stabilized financial markets remains a topic
of debate. See id. (discussing the purpose of the program to stabilize the financial system versus
the view of consumers and small business owners that the credit markets continued to
malfunction).
52. See Editorial, Bankers and their Salaries, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A18 (arguing
that bankers should have more of their own money at risk because the compensation schemes of
some firms “exacerbated the weaknesses and contributed to market turmoil.” (quoting the Institute
of International Finance)).
VOL. 6 NO.1 2011
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blamed for the faltering economy receiving lavish bonuses as a result of
guaranteed-pay schemes.53
B. Legal Background
Compensation of executives of Delaware Corporations is affected by
numerous laws, including Delaware statutory law, federal regulation, and
the common law developed by the Delaware Court of Chancery.54
Delaware law grants corporations the power to “[a]ppoint such officers and
agents as the business of the corporation requires and to pay or otherwise
provide for them suitable compensation.”55 Federal law requires that
compensation of certain executives of publicly traded corporations be
disclosed and reported to the Securities Exchange Commission.56 Much
substantive regulation of executive compensation is left to the marketplace,
where corporations are free to pay executives based on their perceived
value.57 Executive compensation can also be challenged in the Delaware
Court of Chancery through claims of breach of the duty of care,58 duty of
loyalty,59 and waste.60 This section describes a plaintiff’s cause of action
for waste. Part 1 describes the requirement for stockholder plaintiffs to
make pre-suit demand on the corporation and circumstances where such
demand is excused.61 Part 2 describes the standard that must be met to
establish a claim of waste.62 Part 3 describes the heightened pleading
standards required to make claim of waste.63

53. See Jonathan D. Glater, A.I.G. Agrees to Suspend Millions in Executive Bonus Payments,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B4 (describing the compensation to former A.I.G. executives as an
example of excessive greed in corporate America).
54. See infra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.
55. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. §122(5) (2009).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
57. See Elson, supra note 43 (“CEOs get paid a lot because they are perceived by boards of
directors as worth a lot.”).
58. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55–61 (2005) (analyzing
whether the process of approval of Ovitz’s compensation package fell below the standard of due
care or simply failed to follow “best practices”).
59. See In re The Limited, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *
1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2002).
60. See infra Part III.B.2.
61. See infra Part III.B.1.
62. See infra Part III.B.2.
63. See infra Part III.B.3.
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1. The Pre-Suit Demand Requirement and Demand Futility
Corporate directors, not stockholders, manage the affairs of the corporation,
including the decision to sue in the name of the corporation.64 Stockholders
may file a derivative suit, which is essentially an action to compel the
corporation to sue whoever may be liable to it, including the directors of the
corporation.65 To encourage intra-corporate remedies and prevent strike
suits,66 Chancery Rule 23.1 requires that the stockholder first make demand
on the corporation to initiate the lawsuit itself.67 A board typically
considers the demand and declines to sue, and this decision enjoys the
protection of the business judgment rule.68 If a stockholder-plaintiff does
make demand, and in the likely event that the corporation declines to sue,
the derivative suit can continue only upon a showing that refusal of demand
was improper, which is very difficult to accomplish.69
As a result, shareholder-plaintiffs typically avoid making demand, and
instead try to establish that they are excused from the demand requirement
because demand would have been futile.70 The Court of Chancery
developed the Aronson test to assess demand futility.71 The court held that
demand is futile where, “under the particularized facts alleged,72 a
reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and
independent73 [or]74 (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the
64. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. §141(a) (2010).
65. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
66. A strike suit is defined as “[a] suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid
claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated
settlement.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th Ed. 2009).
67. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (citing Chancery Rule 23.1).
68. Id. at 813 (citing Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10). For a discussion of the
business judgment rule, see infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
69. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(a) (2010) gives the corporation power to initiate or refrain from
litigation. See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 782 n.6 and accompanying text. See id. at 784 n.10 and
accompanying text (stating that “the board’s decision [to refuse demand] falls under the ‘business
judgment’ rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met”). Only a showing of
bad faith or interestedness on the part of those making the decision to dismiss the suit can
establish that refusal of demand is improper. See id. at 783.
70. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
71. See id. at 815–16.
72. A shareholder-plaintiff, in attempting to establish demand futility, is subject to a
heightened pleading standard imposed by Del. Ch. 23.1. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 (2010). See also
infra Part III.B.3.
73. The first prong of the Aronson test, which is typically used to challenge interested
transactions and self-dealing, is not invoked in In re Citigroup. In re Citigroup, Inc. S holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. Ch. 2009). In the context of compensation, the first
VOL. 6 NO.1 2011
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product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”75 Because demand on
the corporation will typically terminate a shareholder’s case, establishing
that demand as excused is critical to a plaintiff’s claim.76
A plaintiff may establish that demand is futile, and therefore excused,
based on the first prong of the Aronson test by pleading facts that create a
reasonable doubt whether the directors are disinterested and independent.77
In the context of executive compensation, the first prong of the Aronson test
can be met where directors receive some material benefit not enjoyed by
shareholders of such significance that it is reasonable to question “whether
that director objectively considered the advisability of the challenged
transaction to the corporation and its shareholders,” or whether “a director
stands on both sides of the challenged transaction.”78 In London v.
Tyrrell,79 for example, the plaintiffs effectively established that demand
was futile by showing that the directors granted stock options to
themselves, and were therefore on both sides of their compensation
transaction.80
A plaintiff proceeding under the second prong of the Aronson test
must establish that demand is futile, and therefore excused, by creating a
reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was a product of the valid
exercise of business judgment.81 The business judgment rule is the
presumption enjoyed by corporate boards that their actions are presumed to
prong is invoked where corporate directors award themselves excessive payment for their
services. MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, 2010 WL 1782271, at *18 (Del. Ch. 2010). In
Citigroup, the challenged compensation is to a departing executive, Charles Prince, rather than
compensation of directors themselves, leaving the plaintiffs to proceed on the second prong of the
Aronson test. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 136.
74. Although the original Aronson test states a conjunctive test, it was later clarified that the
two prongs were distinct, and demand would be futile where either could be established. Levine
v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 206 (Del. 1991) (“The point is that in a claim of demand futility, there are
two alternative hurdles, either of which a derivative shareholder complainant must overcome to
successfully withstand a Rule 23.1 motion.”).
75. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
76. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1220 (Del. 1996) (“[A] shareholder who makes a
demand can no longer argue that demand is excused . . . the Board is entitled to have its decision
[regarding the demanded action] analyzed under the business judgment rule unless the
presumption of that rule can be rebutted.” (quoting Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del.
Sup. 1990))).
77. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
78. London v. Tyrrell, No. 3321-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *13–14 (Del. Ch. June 24,
2008) (quoting Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 15–16.
81. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
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be made on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.82 The business
judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption, however, and it may be
overcome by a showing of a lack of good faith,83 gross negligence,84 failure
to monitor,85 or lack of a rational business purpose (waste).86
2. Standard for Establishing a Claim of Waste
A party challenging executive compensation with a claim of waste in the
absence of director interestedness must prove demand futility based on the
second prong of Aronson.87 In the context of waste, “the judicial standard
is. . . well developed.”88 A claim of waste can overcome the business
judgment presumption where corporate assets are exchanged for
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range where
any reasonable person would be willing to trade.89 A wasteful transaction
is one that serves no corporate purpose or one which “is so completely
bereft of consideration that it effectively constituted a gift.”90 Typically,
the Chancery Court acknowledges that waste claims must meet an extreme
test which is rarely satisfied,91 and that its purpose is to “smoke out shady,
bad faith deals” rather than create license for judicial scrutiny of arm’s

82. See Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919) (describing the high threshold which
must be met in order to trigger the court’s intervention in the discretion of the directors of a
corporation).
83. A lack of good faith can be established if a director is fraudulent or consciously disregards
his responsibilities. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); In re The Walt Disney Co.
Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66–67 (Del. 2006). For example, directors were found to be
fraudulent, and therefore demand was excused based on the second prong of Aronson where
directors intentionally manipulated a valuation by withholding positive information and allowing
negative information to be known in order to increase the value of their stock options. London,
No. 3321-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at *17–18.
84. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
85. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996).
86. Even business decisions that in hindsight were extremely unwise receive the protection of
the business judgment rule. See, e.g. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968) (protecting Chicago Cubs owner from liability for significant losses due to his refusal to
build lights and schedule baseball games at night).
87. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
88. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. Ch. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699
A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)).
89. Id.
90. Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000).
91. Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698
A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997)).
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length bargains.92 Indeed, the extreme standard for waste “is a corollary of
the proposition that where business judgment presumptions are applicable,
the board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any
rational business purpose.’”93
In making the determination of whether a waste claim will survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, the court will make a
substantive review of the challenged transaction,94 and determine whether
the complaint sufficiently alleges that no consideration was made.95 The
plaintiff is required to plead facts that raise a reasonable doubt that there
was a complete failure of consideration.96 What constitutes sufficient
consideration can be a difficult question in the case of executive
compensation, and in rejecting motions to dismiss, the Chancery Court has
noted its discretionary function in analyzing facts.97
Executive compensation creates particularly difficult analysis given
the often “ephemeral” nature of the consideration received by a corporation
in executive compensation packages, especially in stock option plans and
severance agreements.98 Even in light of this difficulty of valuation in
dollar terms, the Chancery Court still requires plaintiffs to plead facts
showing that the corporation “failed to receive any benefit.”99 The
Chancery Court has recognized even unquantifiable agreements to be
sufficient consideration in various contexts. In Grobow v. Perot,100 General
92. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 656–57 (2008) (stating the rule that
judicial scrutiny of a claim of corporate waste may not proceed if given the facts pled in the
complaint, “any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense”) (quoting Harbor
Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999)).
93. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73 (Del. 2006) (quoting
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
94. See Lewis v. Hett, No. 6752, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 546, at *8–11 (Del. Ch. 1984)
(analyzing the facts alleged in the complaint surrounding the compensation of Hett, a board
member, and refusing to consider an affidavit).
95. In re 3Com Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *13 (Del. Ch.
1999).
96. Id.
97. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 339 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that “[s]ince what is a
‘well-pleaded’ fact and what is a ‘mere conclusion’ is not always clear, there is often and
inevitably some small room for the exercise of informed judgment by courts in determining
motions to dismiss under the appropriate test”). In Lewis, the Court was also willing to consider
the fact that one-time option grants were unusual, which led to the conclusion that the
compensation was sufficiently unusual to dismiss the motion to dismiss in the interest of acquiring
more evidence. Id. at 339.
98. See In re 3Com Corp., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *14–15.
99. Id. (emphasis in original).
100. 539 A.2d 180 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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Motors purchased all of its shares owned by H. Ross Perot, who had
become a vocal critic of the GM management.101 He received $745 million
in exchange for his stockholdings and made commitments to General
Motors to stop criticizing its management, not compete with a GM
subsidiary, and not purchase GM stock or engage in a proxy contest for five
years.102 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that buying Perot’s
silence, and various other commitments, constituted waste.103
3. The Plaintiff’s Pleading Burden Under Chancery Rule 23.1
A shareholder-plaintiff seeking to establish a claim of waste must overcome
the deferential business-judgment prong of the Aronson test, and create a
reasonable doubt that the transaction meets the extremely stringent standard
for waste.104 The requirements of Chancery Rule 23.1 make this task even
more difficult.105 The demand requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 creates a
heightened pleading standard that is more stringent than Chancery Rule
8(a), the general notice pleading standard.106 Although a plaintiff is not
expected to plead evidence, Rule 23.1 requires greater “particularity” of
factual detail than the typical notice pleading standard, however, and
conclusory allegations unsupported by such factual allegations are not taken
as true.107 While analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to make
demand, the Chancery Court will take all well-pleaded facts as true and
make inferences in favor of the plaintiff that logically flow from the

101. Id. at 184.
102. Id. at 184–85.
103. Id. at 189.
104. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
105. Compare Del. Ch. Ct. R. 8(a) (2009) (stating general rules of pleading, which require a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), with Del.
Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 (2010) (stating that in derivative actions by shareholders, “[t]he complaint shall
also allege. . . with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort”).
106. Chancery Rule 8(a) states that
[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party claim shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment for
the relief to which the party deems itself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded.
De1. R. Ch. Ct. 8(a) (2009).
107. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
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particularized facts alleged.108 The court will not consider affidavits or
other materials not included in the complaint.109
In Lewis v. Hett,110 the shareholders alleged waste, and pleaded
particularized facts showing that the directors approved a severance
agreement with an executive who had voluntarily resigned, had no
employment contract, and served at the will of the board.111 The
shareholders’ complaint alleged that no consideration had been received in
exchange for the severance agreement.112 The Chancery Court found the
pleadings to be sufficiently particularized and to raise a reasonable doubt
“that the severance payments constitute a gift or waste of corporate assets
and, therefore, that ‘the challenged transaction was. . . the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment.”113
The Court of Chancery faces a highly factual analysis when
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand.114 A plaintiff
in shareholder derivative cases often faces problems pleading the necessary
facts because Rule 23.1 motions precede discovery, so a the Chancery
Court’s ability to find for the plaintiff is often based on the amount of
information a plaintiff has before discovery.115
A lack of information is not always dealt with consistently.116 For
example, efforts by plaintiffs to overcome a lack of particularized facts with
108. Id. at 255.
109. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. Ch. 1990).
110. No. 6752, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 546 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1984).
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 10–11. Although an affidavit provided by the defendant added undisputed facts that
the executive’s resignation was not voluntary and that there was consideration to the corporation,
the court refused to consider the affidavit, citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. Ch. 1984)
for the rule that the court may only consider the facts alleged within the complaint.
113. Id. at 11 (quoting [citation unavailable]).
114. Grobow v. Perot 539 A.2d 180, 186 (1988); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338–39
(Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that because what is a “well pleaded” fact and what is a “mere
conclusion” is not always clear, there is some small room for the exercise of informed judgment).
In Lewis, the court considered an executive compensation agreement that had been ratified by the
shareholders. Id. at 329. The court refused to dismiss the claim of waste because one time grants
to directors seemed sufficiently unusual to require evidence before making an adjudication of their
consistency with fiduciary duty. Id. at 339.
115. See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 339 (reasoning that although it is difficult to make an inherently
factual determination on a motion to dismiss, a court cannot allow a waste claim to go forward
where there is simply an allegation of the facts of the case coupled with a statement that the
transaction constitutes a waste of assets).
116. Compare Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999) (refusing
to consider excerpts from newspaper articles about problems in the used car business because the
plaintiff failed to plead that the articles were relevant to the allegedly wasteful transaction), with
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industry news about the value of an investment have been deemed an
insufficient method of overcoming such a lack of facts.117 On the other
hand, the Chancery Court has acknowledged that because the difference
between a well pleaded fact and a mere conclusion can be unclear, there is
some small room for the court to exercise “informed judgment” in
determining motions to dismiss.118 In Lewis v. Vogelstein,119 the Chancery
Court refused to dismiss a claim of waste where a stock option plan was
alleged to have failed to give the corporation assurance that it would receive
adequate value in exchange for the grant of stock options.120 The court was
influenced by its intuition that a one-time option grant was sufficiently
unusual, and refused to dismiss the case because it required more evidence
before ruling on the claim.121
IV. THE COURT’S REASONING

In In re Citigroup, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation,122 the Delaware
Court of Chancery rejected the plaintiffs’ Caremark claims,123 and then
assessed whether each of the four following claims of waste would survive
a motion to dismiss under Delaware law: (1) the compensation agreement
between Citigroup and Charles Prince (2) Citigroup’s purchase of over $2.7
billion of subprime assets (3) approving the buyback of stock at inflated
stock price, and (4) allowing the company to invest in special investment
vehicles (“SIVs”) that were unable to pay off maturing debt.124
Lewis, 699 A.2d at 338–39 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting that because it is unclear what the difference is
between a “well pleaded” fact and a “mere conclusion,” there is “some small room for the exercise
of informed judgment by courts in determining motions to dismiss” and considering the one-time
nature of an option grant in ruling on a Motion to Dismiss.).
117. Harbor Fin., 751 A.2d at 892 (finding that the plaintiff had not pled facts to support the
conclusion that no rational person could find the transaction sensible where the plaintiff’s
complaint included snippets of news articles and quotes from industry competitors describing the
poor prospects for investors in used car businesses).
118. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 338–39.
119. 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).
120. Id. at 339.
121. Id.
122. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
123. The court dedicated the bulk of the decision to plaintiffs Caremark claims, and refused to
allow claims that a failure to monitor business risk could create liability under Caremark. See In
re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123–35. The focus of this case note is the claim of waste, however, so
the details of the court’s decision regarding the Caremark claims will not be discussed in this
section.
124. The court quickly dismissed the claims of waste based on the investment in SIVs at the
outset of its discussion of the waste claims. Id. It pointed out that the plaintiffs failed to adequately
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The Court of Chancery began its analysis by noting that the plaintiffs
sought to argue demand futility based on the second prong of the Aronson
test, which requires a plaintiff to plead particularized facts that raise a
reasonable doubt whether “the challenged transaction was otherwise the
product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”125 The court also
enunciated the standard for excusing demand on a claim of waste, stating
that a plaintiff must “plead particularized facts that lead to a reasonable
inference that the director defendants authorized “an exchange that is so
one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”126 To
overcome the presumption of good faith, a plaintiff must show that the
board’s decision was “so egregious or irrational that it could not have been
based on a valid assessment of the corporation’s best interests.”127
The Chancery Court first considered whether Citigroup’s repurchase
of stock constituted waste.128 The plaintiff argued that the Citigroup
directors’ buyback of stock constituted waste because it approved the stock
purchase when it was trading at an average price of $53.37, which the
directors would have known was an inflated price but for their reckless
failure to consider impending subprime losses.129 The court rejected this
argument as an “utter [] fail[ure] to state a claim for waste.”130 The court
emphasized the fact that a purchase of stock at market value was a clearly a
rational act of business that fell well below the standard for waste.131 The
court allowed Citigroup’s failure to recognize various “red flags” in the
plead that the challenged corporate activity was the result of board action, as opposed to inaction,
which is required to excuse demand for a claim of waste. Id. The court alternately pointed out that
these claims do not create a substantial likelihood of liability for the director defendants because
the complaint fails to establish the bad faith which would be required to overcome the business
judgment rule. Id. The court, referring to its discussion of the Caremark claims that it dismissed,
reasserted that the “red flags” alleged by the plaintiff did not support an inference of bad faith, and
that the ultimately failing investments fell squarely within the business judgment rule. In re
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 135 n.96 (citing Highland Legacy Ltd. v. Singer, No. 1566-N, 2006 WL
741939, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2006)).
125. Id. at 136 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)).
126. Id. (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. Sup. 2000)) (quoting In re The
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998))).
127. Id. (quoting White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n. 36 (Del. Ch. 2001).
128. Id. at 136–37.
129. Id. at 137.
130. Id.
131. The court implied that purchasing stock at market value was not, by definition, waste
because “the market price–the price at which presumably ordinary and rational businesspeople
were trading the stock–could [not] possibly be so one sided that no reasonable and ordinary
business person would consider it adequate consideration.” In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 137.
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subprime market to fall within the protection of the business judgment rule,
as it had for the plaintiff’s Caremark claims.132
The court then began its analysis of the Letter Agreement, which
reflected the compensation agreement between Citigroup and its CEO
Charles Prince, by stating that although corporations generally have broad
discretion to determine compensation of their executives, the outer limit of
the discretion was the point at which the compensation “is so
disproportionately large as to be unconscionable and constitute waste.”133
The court then considered whether the multimillion dollar compensation
package, contingent on Mr. Prince signing a non-compete agreement, a
non-disparagement agreement, a non-solicitation agreement, and a release
of claims against Citigroup was “so one sided” as to constitute waste.134
The court noted that it had very little information about how much
additional compensation Mr. Prince received based on the Letter Agreement
and the actual value of the agreements signed by Mr. Prince.135 It stated
that, as a result of the lack of information, and because it was required to
take the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, a reasonable doubt existed that the
agreement was so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound
judgment could concluded that the corporation received adequate
consideration.136 The court did not provide any reasoning as to why the
Letter Agreement created such a reasonable doubt, and instead apparently
relied on the premise that “the discretion of directors in setting executive
compensation is not unlimited.”137 As a result, the court held that the
plaintiffs’ adequately alleged that demand was futile based on the second
prong of Aronson, and refused to dismiss the claim of waste.138
132. The bulk of the decision was dedicated to an analysis of the plaintiff’s attempt to use a
Caremark-style claim to essentially circumvent the business judgment rule. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at
123–31. The plaintiff argued that the director’s failure to recognize “red flags” in the subprime
market constituted a failure to monitor. Id. at 124. The court flatly rejected this argument,
reasoning that if it were to hold directors liable for suffering losses for failure to foresee market
downturns, then it would also be required to hold directors liable for failing to foresee market
downturns and profit from them. Id. at 131 n. 78.
133. Id. at 138 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 n.56 (Del. Sup. 2000).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. (restating the terms of the compensation transaction and simply concluding that
there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the transaction constituted waste).
138. See id. The court then rejected the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim. Id. at 139. It reasoned that the pleading demand futility is a higher
standard than that required to survive a 12(b)(6) motion and cited the rule that “a complaint that
survives a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 23.1 will also survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
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Despite a conclusory affirmation of the importance of the business
judgment rule and a statement that “we must not let our desire to blame
someone for our losses make us lose sight of the purpose of our law,”139 the
Chancery Court’s decision in In re: Citigroup creates confusion regarding
shareholder complaints that executive compensation amounts to waste.140
The court, in an apparent attempt to vindicate popular anger over executive
compensation,141 created confusion about directors’ ability to make
compensation decisions by: (1) enunciating a weakened standard for
waste;142 (2) raising the threat of strike suits;143and (3) creating
unnecessary concern over tying executive compensation to long-term
measures of risk.144
A. The Court Failed to Afford the Citigroup Board Business Judgment
Deference Typically Associated with Compensation Decisions
The court’s decision failed to enunciate the typically strict standard for
waste and, in doing so, undermined the previous understanding that claims
of waste in executive compensation decisions receive the same business
judgment deference as other disinterested board decisions.145 Although the
court properly stated the standard for determining demand futility on the
second prong of Aronson,146 it failed to include the strict language typically
associated with the rule.147
assuming that it otherwise contains sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim.” Id. (quoting
McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008)).
139. Id. The court had rejected all of the plaintiffs’ claims based on the directors failures to
respond to “red flags” that signaled the impending subprime financial meltdown. See also supra
note 132 and accompanying text.
140. See infra Parts V.A–C.
141. See Michael J. Biles & Kimberly G. Davis, Keeping Current: Corporate Compensation,
19 BUSINESS LAW TODAY 1 (Sept./Oct. 2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw
/blt/2009-09-10/keepingcurrent-corpcomp.shtml (stating that “[c]ourts are not immune to political
zeitgeist” in reference to the chancery decision in Citigroup)
142. See infra Part V.A.
143. See infra Part V.B.
144. See infra Part V.C.
145. See In re Citigroup Inc. Derivative Litig., 964 A.3d, 136 (Del. Ch. 2009).
146. The second prong of Aronson requires showing that “under the particularized facts
alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: . . . the challenged transaction was otherwise the
product of a valid exercise of business judgment.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del.
Ch. 1984).
147. See infra notes 148–53 (demonstrating that the standard stated in Citigroup failed to
include rigorous language typically associated with analysis of waste claims).
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The court did not misstate the standard for waste, and much of the rule
it enunciated was the same rigorous language it had used in previous
cases.148 Still, it failed to include language that demonstrates that waste is
an extreme test149 meant to “smoke out shady, bad faith deals”150 that are
“so completely bereft of consideration that [they] effectively constituted a
gift.”151 While the court acknowledged the wide discretion given to
compensation decisions, it focused on the “‘outer limit’ [of] the board’s
discretion to set executive compensation, ‘at which point a decision is so
disproportionately large as to be unconscionable and constitute waste.’”152
Although the court was not incorrect that such an “outer limit” exists, it
failed to recognize that the outer limit begins where a compensation
agreement demonstrates a complete failure, rather than an imbalance, of
consideration.153
In applying this weakened standard, the court did not grant Citigroup’s
directors the protection of the business judgment rule in its executive
compensation agreement, although it had done so for all of Citigroup’s
other investment decisions.154 Its failure to do so is inconsistent with the
court’s previous understanding of waste as a “corollary of the proposition
148. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 136 (stating that the plaintiff must “allege particularized
facts that lead to a reasonable inference that the director defendants authorized ‘an exchange that
is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration’” (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263
(Del. Sup. 2000) (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del.
Ch. 1998))), and stating that the plaintiff must show that the board’s decision was “so egregious or
irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the the corporation’s best
interests” (quoting White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001)).
149. See Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (2008) (quoting Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d
384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997)) (finding that the plaintiffs’ claim that, based on the facts alleged by the
plaintiffs, the grant by the corporation to the defendants meets the extreme test for waste because
it served no valid corporate purpose).
150. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 656–57 (2008) (stating the rule that
judicial scrutiny of a claim of corporate waste may not proceed if given the facts pled in the
complaint, “any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense”).
151. Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000).
152. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner 746 A.2d, 244, 262 n.56 (Del. Sup.
2000) (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962))).
153. Compare infra note 154 and accompanying text, with In re 3Com Corp. S’holders Litig.,
No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *13 (Del. Ch. 1999).
154. Compare In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 (protecting the directors’ unwise decision to
invest heavily in subprime assets because the business judgment rule protects decisions made on
an informed basis in good faith and with an honest belief that the decision was in the best interests
of the company), with id. at 138 (failing to protect the directors’ decision with regards to Charles
Prince’s compensation package despite the plaintiffs’ failure to allege a complete lack of
consideration or business purpose).
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that where business judgment presumptions are applicable, the board’s
decision will be upheld unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational
business purpose.’”155 The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims of waste
for other investment decisions,156 but singled out the severance agreement
with Charles Prince.157 In doing so, it failed to recognize that the burden is
on the plaintiff to establish a complete failure of consideration, and that
even ephemeral consideration is valid under the waste standard.158
1. The Court Failed to Place the Burden of Establishing a Complete Failure
of Consideration on the Plaintiff
The court noted that it had “very little information regarding. . . the real
value, if any, of the various promises given by Prince.”159 Because it had
little information, and taking the plaintiffs’ allegations at true, it determined
that a reasonable doubt existed that the transaction was so one sided that
“no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration.”160 In doing so, the court
failed to place the burden of “establish[ing] a complete failure of
consideration, and not merely the insufficiency of the consideration
received,” on the plaintiffs.161
The plaintiffs alleged the following in regards to Charles Prince’s
Letter Agreement:

155. In re Disney, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971)).
156. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 136–37.
157. Id. at 138.
158. See infra Parts V.A.1–2.
159. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138.
160. Id. at 136–38.
161. Compare In re 3Com Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *13
(Del. Ch. 1999) (requiring that the plaintiff allege facts that establish a complete failure of
consideration), with In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
263 (Del. Sup. 2000) (requiring an exchange so disproportionate that no reasonable person would
be willing to trade). The Citigroup court failed to recognize the language from Brehm that
immediately followed the quoted statement, which clarified its meaning to be that
Most often the claim is associated with a transfer of corporate assets that serves no
corporate purpose; or for which no consideration at all is received. Such a transfer is in
effect a gift. If, however, there is any substantial consideration received by the
corporation, and if there is a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the
transaction is worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder
would conclude ex post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.
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212. The Director Defendants are liable to the Company for
waste for having approved the Letter Agreement dated November
4, 2007 between Citigroup and Prince. Under the terms of the
Letter Agreement, Prince, who is largely responsible for
Citigroup’s problems, will still receive a $12.5 million cash
bonus only $1.3 million less than his 2006 bonus where Prince
was employed as CEO for the entire year and Citigroup’s stock
price never dipped below $45.05.
213. The terms of the Letter Agreement are so one-sided so that
no person acting in a good faith pursuit of the Company’s
interests could have approved the terms of the Letter
Agreement.162
The plaintiff failed to establish that the Letter Agreement with Charles
Prince was a one-sided transaction completely devoid of consideration.163
Facts outside the complaint demonstrate that there was consideration in the
case: Prince signed non-compete, non-disparagement, non-solicitation
agreements, and a release of claims.164 Even if the court considered only
the facts in the Plaintiffs’ complaint, nothing in the complaint shows that
the compensation package symbolized by the Letter Agreement suffered a
complete failure of consideration.165
The Lewis v. Hett166 decision provides an example of how a severance
agreement with a departing executive can constitute a complete failure of
consideration.167 In Lewis, the complaint alleged that, according to the
terms of a severance package, significant sums would be paid to Hett, a
retiring executive, despite the fact that he had voluntarily resigned, had no
employment contract, and served at the will of the board.168 Such a
purposeless severance agreement created a reasonable doubt that the
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.169 In

162. Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 212–13, In re
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC).
163. See id.
164. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138.
165. See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 212–13, In re
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC) (alleging that the terms of Prince’s
compensation package were high despite a decline in the stock value of Citigroup, but failing to
state facts that there was a complete failure of consideration).
166. No. 6752, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 546 (Del. Ch. 1984).
167. Id. at *10–11.
168. Id. at *10.
169. Id. at *10–11.
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contrast, the plaintiffs in In re Citigroup failed to demonstrate that the
severance agreement was without purpose, and unlike Hett, Charles Prince
did not depart from Citigroup on a voluntary basis.170 Nothing in the
complaint creates a doubt that the Letter Agreement between Citigroup and
Prince was a complete failure of consideration.171
2. The Court Ignored Precedent that Demonstrates that Even Difficult to
Value Consideration is Sufficient to Avoid a Claim of Waste
The court acknowledged that although Citigroup, under the terms of the
Letter Agreement with Charles Prince, would receive certain promises
including a non-compete, non-disparagement, non solicitation agreement,
and a release of claims.172 Regardless, it held that there was still a
reasonable doubt that the Letter Agreement was “so one sided” as to
constitute waste.173 In doing so, the court ignored precedent that
demonstrates that even where consideration is “ephemeral [and]. . .not
susceptible to identification and valuation in dollar terms,” the plaintiff is
not excused from demonstrating facts that the corporation failed to receive
any benefit.174 For example, paying a premium during a stock repurchase
was not waste where the corporation received an agreement from an
outspoken shareholder/director who criticized management to cease from
doing so and not to compete with the company.175 In addition, the
Delaware Court of Chancery noted that consideration for a stock option
plan, namely “continued and greater efforts by employees,” is ephemeral in
nature, but such ephemeral consideration still must be overcome with a

170. See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 212–13, In re
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC) (failing to establish that Citigroup
received no consideration in exchange for Charles Prince’s severance agreement).
171. See id. (alleging that Prince would receive a $12.5 million cash bonus (only $1.3 million
less than his 2006 bonus), despite being “largely responsible for Citigroup’s problems,” and
stating the conclusion that the transaction was so one-sided that no one acting in good faith could
have approved the terms of the agreement, but failing to allege that there was a complete failure of
consideration.).
172. In re Citigroup v. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009).
173. Id.
174. In re 3Com Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *14–15 (Del.
Ch. 1999).
175. Grobow v. Perot, 539.2d 180, 181, 184–85 (Del. 1988) (finding that GM’s repurchase of
all of vocal minority shareholder’s stock in exchange for his agreement to stop criticizing GM
management, not to engage in a proxy contest, and not to compete was not waste and a decision
protected by the business judgment rule).

190

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

J W. C

specific factual allegation that the company has failed to receive any
benefit.176
The consideration received by Citigroup is ephemeral in nature.177
Although the the financial collapse made compensation agreements such as
these repugnant to the public, corporations need to be free to negotiate with
their executives, many of whom leave during periods of corporate loss.178
The In re: Citigroup court failed to give such negotiations the deference of
the business judgment rule.179
B. The Court’s Decision Raises the Threat of Strike Suits
Although the court’s decision afforded Citigroup the protection of the
business judgment rule when it came to the variety of risk taken by the
corporate directors and managers,180 the court demonstrated its willingness
to scrutinize executive compensation packages despite the judicial
deference they typically enjoy.181 The court’s refusal to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claim of waste will raise the threat of strike suits because it
undermines Chancery Rule 23.1 and enables shareholder plaintiffs to
survive a motion to dismiss, raising the settlement value of their claim.182
The demand requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 and Aronson exists to
provide a safeguard against strike suits, which can unnecessarily distract
directors from their duties to manage the corporation.183 The Chancery
Court views claims of waste for executive compensation in the same light,
emphasizing that if simply alleging the facts of a transaction and stating that

176. In re 3Com, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *14–15.
177. Compare In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (describing Charles Prince’s nondisparagement, non-compete, and non-solicitation agreements), with Growbow, 539 A.2d at 184
(describing H. Ross Perot’s silence and non-compete provisions of a repurchase of his stock).
178. SORKIN, supra note 9, at 161 (demonstrating the need for companies to keep executives
on noncompete agreements).
179. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138.
180. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part V.A.
182. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc.,
2008 WL 553205, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“Because a derivative action, by its very nature,
impinges on the managerial freedom of directors, Chancery Rule 23.1 operates as a threshold to
insure that plaintiffs exhaust intracorporate remedies and protect against strike suits.”). See also
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 339 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“[I]t cannot be the case that allegations
of the facts of any (or every) transaction coupled with a statement that the transaction constitutes a
waste of assets, necessarily states a claim upon which discovery may be had; such a rule would, in
this area, constitute an undue encouragement to strike suits.”).
183. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984).
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the transaction constitutes waste meets the pleading standard, strike suits
would be unduly encouraged.184 Although it is unclear whether the holding
of Citigroup changed the waste standard for good or whether this more
relaxed approach was a rare exception,185 lawsuits over executive
compensation have been on the rise.186 The language of the plaintiffs’
complaint simply states that a departing CEO will receive a large bonus
despite major problems within the company, and that such a compensation
agreement is so one-sided that it could not have been made in good faith.187
Given that many CEOs lost their jobs during the financial crisis and were
paid significant severance packages,188 there will be ample opportunity for
shareholders of other corporations to draft similar complaints against CEOs
with severance agreements.189 Shareholders will surely take notice of the In
re Citigroup decision and be encouraged to file derivative actions.190

184. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 339.
185. Broc Romanck & Dave Lynn, Delaware Dismisses Caremark Claims against Citigroup:
CEO Pay “Waste” Claim Survives, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL.NET BLOG (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/002030 html.
186. Paul R. Bessette et al., Executive Bonuses Triggering Lawsuits Nationwide, THE
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202429689471
(last visited Nov. 20, 2009). See also Executive Compensation Under Fire, GREENBERG
TRAURIG, LLP, http://www.gtlaw.com/NewsEvents/Publications/Alerts?find=115034 (last visited
September 16, 2010) (warning clients in an online memo discussing Citigroup: “don’t be
surprised if many more companies face similar challenges to executive compensation decisions in
the near future”).
187. Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint ¶ 212–13, Aug. 21, 2008.
188. See, e.g., Craig Harris, Fired CEO to get cash payout from Starbucks, SEATTLE PI (Jan.
28, 2008), http://www.seattlepi.com/business/349081_sbux29 html; Jonathan Berr, Before Getting
Fired, Wachovia CEO Thompson Got Gobs of Money, (June 2, 2008),
http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2008/06/02/before-getting-fired-wachovia-ceo-thompson-gotgobs-of-money.
189. Indeed, many corporations fire their executives (or pressure them to step down) because
the company has suffered losses. Dan Fitzpatrick et. al., Thain Ousted in Clash at Bank of
America, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2009, at A1 (describing the ouster of John Thain from Merrill
Lynch due to large losses). If they are unable to negotiate agreements with those executives
during that process for fear of shareholder suits, they will likely be limited in their ability to find
better management at the most critical times in the life of the corporation. Cf. Jonathan Weisman
& Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays Out Limits on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A1
(reporting on concerns that government intervention into corporate boardrooms might have
blocked the filling of vital jobs in troubled companies).
190. See Bessette, supra note 186 (warning clients in an online memo discussing Citigroup:
“don’t be surprised if many more companies face similar challenges to executive compensation
decisions in the near future”).
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C. The Court’s Apparent Preference for Compensation Tied to Long-Term
Corporate Gain is an Unnecessary Intrusion on Board DecisionMaking
Corporate advisors have taken notice of this decision,191 and have been
advising the corporate world to ensure that they make a reasonable, welldocumented process for making compensation decisions and tie
compensation to long-term performance rather than short-term performance
metrics.192 If the Chancery Court intended to influence corporate behavior
or vindicate popular opinion,193 its holding in Citigroup was unnecessary194
and problematic.195
Although executive compensation grew to unprecedented levels in the
years leading up to the credit crisis,196 the court’s holding was an
unnecessary step toward correcting those perceived problems, particularly
in light of the negative impact the decision will have on the business
community.197 The credit crisis and ensuing recession were precipitated by
a massive bubble in the housing market.198 The risks taken during that
period, and the profits reported during those periods, revealed themselves to
be the result of irrational and irresponsible market behavior rather than real
gains in market value.199 It is only logical that executive compensation
would reach unprecedented heights during a period where financial markets
reach similarly unprecedented levels. The court’s decision, which will
create new fear of liability and intrude on board decision making, was
191. See Biles & Davis, supra note 141.
192. Washington’s New Limits on Executive Compensation, PAUL HASTINGS STAY CURRENT
(Paul Hastings, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2009, at 1–4, available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1205.pdf?wt mc_ID=1205.pdf (advising clients
to be proactive in order to placate the American public, Congress, and the public by avoiding
short-term incentive compensation, among other things).
193. See Biles, supra note 141 (stating that “[c]ourts are not immune to political zeitgeist” in
reference of the Chancery decision in Citigroup).
194. See infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text (demonstrating that corporations are being
advised to address executive compensation issues in response to pressure from the public,
Congress, and the executive branch).
195. See supra Part V.B.
196. See supra note 43.
197. See supra Part V.B. (demonstrating that the Citigroup decision will raise the threat of
strike suits).
198. See supra Part III.A.
199. See Elson, supra note 43 (“The value that many superpaid CEO superstars supposedly
created has largely disappeared. . . the very profits that many of the companies reported appear to
have been the product more of auditors’ imaginations than of any CEO’s strategy for seizing or
creating value.”).
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unnecessary in light of the fact that the corporate executive labor market is
itself a bubble that is apparently popping.200 Mounting political pressure,201
changes in corporate culture,202 and the deflated market are bringing down
levels in executive pay.203 Before undermining the business judgment rule,
the court should have considered those factors and recognized that its
contribution to the deflation of executive pay was not necessary.
The court’s ruling, which will have the effect of influencing
corporations to tie compensation to longer-term measures of corporate
success,204 raises a number of questions: what kind of compensation
structure will satisfy the court? Should the court have such an impact on
compensation decisions? Will that effect have an adverse impact on
executive willingness to take risks? Will tying compensation to long-term
corporate success help prevent another crisis?
It is unclear what kinds of compensation structures will satisfy the
Delaware Court of Chancery after its decision in Citigroup.205 The court
allowed a claim to survive a motion to dismiss where Citigroup paid a
departing CEO despite his alleged responsibility for the failures of the
company, and corporate advisers now recommend that compensation
agreements should tie reward to long-term measures of corporate
success.206 The problem with this recommendation is that the same stock

200. See Don Pittis, Popping the Executive Compensation Bubble, CBCNEWS, Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/02/05/f-pittis-ceocompensation html (“The collapse of the
Wall Street banks has poked an enormous hole in the idea of merit pay and perquisites.”); James
Saft, Is the Executive Pay Bubble Popping?, REUTERS BLOG (Jan. 28, 2009, 7:59 PM),
http://blogs reuters.com/great-debate/2009/01/28/is-the-executive-pay-bubble-popping
(demonstrating the link between the housing bubble and executive compensation).
201. See Poerio, supra note 192 (noting pressure from Washington on TARP and non-TARP
executive pay).
202. In the late 1990s the attitude toward executive compensation was that
The best bargain is an expensive CEO. . . You cannot overpay a good CEO and you
can’t underpay a bad one. The bargain CEO is one who is unbelievably well
compensated because he’s creating wealth for the shareholders. If his compensation is
not tied to the shareholders’ returns, everyone’s playing a fool’s game.
Elson, supra note 43.
203. See e.g., Susanne Craig & Matthias Rieker, Goldman Bows on CEO Pay—Blankfein’s
Take for 2009 is Half of Rival’s at J.P. Morgan, Amid Public Uproar, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2010,
at A1 (reporting that Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein would be getting a significantly
smaller annual bonus in response to public pressure over pay).
204. See Biles & Davis, supra note 141.
205. See id. (“The Citigroup decision may mark the beginning of a new era in Delaware
business jurisprudence.”).
206. See id.
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option207 plans that attempted to tie executive payment to corporate success
are now being blamed for encouraging executives to take too much risk.208
The irony of this result is that stock option plans were favored because they
aligned the interests of executives, who were typically risk-averse, and
shareholders, whose appetite for risk is high.209 Some commentators
suggest tying a higher proportion of bonuses to longer term measures of
success and to allow “clawbacks” of bonuses earned on deals that later
reveal themselves to be unsuccessful.210
The impact of the court’s decision is contrary to a key purpose of the
business judgment rule, which is to recognize that managers and directors
should decide how their company will “maximize shareholder value in the
long term by taking risks without the debilitating fear that they will be held
personally liable.”211 The business judgment rule seeks to protect risk
takers, not consider how much risk they should have taken.212 Ultimately,
the financial crisis was less likely caused by the fact the corporate
executives took on too much risk and more likely caused by the fact that so
many took the same risk, as is characteristic in market bubbles.213 In
irrational market conditions, even the prospect of going uncompensated has
proven to not be enough to stop extreme risk taking.214 Lehman Brothers
provides a powerful example of a highly-respected investment bank with an
extreme appetite for risk going bankrupt despite the fact that the company
compensated its executives (and all of its employees) based on long-term

207. A stock option is the right to purchase shares of a company at a certain price at a certain
date in the future. See ZANDI, supra note 23, at 1554.
208. See SORKIN, supra note 9, at 534. See also Editorial, Bankers and their Salaries, supra
note 52, at A18 (quoting the Institute of International Finance) (arguing that bankers should have
more of their own money at risk because the compensation schemes of some firms “exacerbated
the weaknesses and contributed to the market turmoil”).
209. Roshan Sonthalia, Comment, Shareholder Voting on All Stock Option Plans: An
Unnecessary and Unwise Proposition, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2004).
210. Roy C. Smith, Greed is Good, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at W1. But see Miriam A.
Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive
Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 96 MINN. L. REV. 368, 390–91 (2009).
211. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009).
212. See id. at 122 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967–68)
(noting that the business judgment rule does not look to the content of the board decision apart
from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed and that degrees of
substantive error in the decision are not relevant).
213. See FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 121–22, 271 (demonstrating that the housing bubble and
subsequent financial crisis were the result of a typical bubble).
214. See, e.g., infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
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measures of success.215 Such a payment scheme was not enough to stop the
company’s executives from being a major participant in leveraged and risky
speculative investment in real estate securities.216
VI. CONCLUSION

By denying Citigroup’s motion to dismiss, the Delaware Court of Chancery
strayed from the typically rigorous pleading requirements and substantive
rule for making a claim of waste for corporate executive compensation
decisions.217 This holding has signaled to corporate directors that the court
will not always afford executive compensation decisions the same level of
deference that it does other business decisions.218 This departure will lead
to an increase in strike suits,219 and the court’s efforts to encourage
corporations to tie compensation more closely to long-term performance
will do more harm than good.220

215. See McDonald & Robinson, supra note 8, at 318 (demonstrating the impact of the failure
of Lehman Brothers on its employees, whose bonuses came in the form of stock). See also
William D. Cohan, Inside Dick Fuld’s Bunker, THE DAILY BEAST, (Dec. 3, 2009, 12:52 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-12-03/inside-dick-fulds-bunker (noting that
Dick Fuld, CEO of Lehman Brothers, lost approximately $1 billion in net worth as a result of the
Lehman collapse).
216. See McDonald & Robinson, supra note 8, at 135–36 (demonstrating Lehman Brothers’
participation in the highly risky CDO market in the midst of the real estate boom).
217. See supra Part V.A.
218. See supra Parts V.B–C.
219. See supra Part V.B.
220. See supra Part V.C.
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